The Catholic Lawyer
Volume 9
Number 4 Volume 9, Autumn 1963, Number 4

Article 7

Punitive Expatriation

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl
This Recent Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Catholic Lawyer by an authorized editor of St. John's Law
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

RECENT DECISIONS

new citizenship, Congress, in 1868, 3 recognized voluntary expatriation as an "inherent
right" of all individuals. In 1907, Congress
provided that the performance of certain
acts4 would constitute a renunciation of citizenship and effect a voluntary expatriation.
The passage of this statute transformed the
right of voluntary expatriation into a totally
different concept. Expatriation, which had
been the act of the citizen, was now to become that of the State.
In Mackenzie v. Hare,5 a native-born
American woman married a citizen of
Great Britain who resided here. When she
sought registration as a voter, her application was refused on the ground that she had
lost her citizenship by marrying a foreigner.
The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of
her petition for mandamus. The Court refused to state unequivocally that citizenship
could be involuntarily lost, and hence it
emphasized that this was a "condition
voluntarily entered into with notice of the
consequences." 6 However, the idea of voluntary expatriation employed in this opinion
was clearly distinguishable from that contained in the Act of 1868. It was no longer
necessary to have a voluntary renunciation
of citizenship. When the individual willfully
performed the act designated by the statute,
he automatically effected his expatriation.
Subsequently, the rationale of this case
was adopted in Savorgnan v. United States!
There the Court, applying a section of the

Nationality Act of 1940,8 held that expatriation could result even though the
individual did not have a specific intent to
renounce his citizenship. 9 Thus, a citizen
would be held to have "voluntarily" relinquished his citizenship when he freely
performed the act designated by the statute.10
While the prior decisions had tenuously
clung to the idea that the American national was voluntarily surrendering his
citizenship,1" in Perez v. Brownell12 the
Court decided that a citizen could be expatriated for voting in a foreign election
even though he did not intend that result.
The majority reasoned that the primary
s Section

2 of the Act of 1907, re-enacted in the

Nationality Act of 1940, provided that an Ameri-

can citizen may be expatriated by "taking an oath
of allegiance to a foreign state." 54 Stat. 1169
(1940), 8 U.S.C. § 801(b) (1946). Under the
Nationality Act, the following acts would result in

expatriation for an American citizen: foreign military service, foreign employment under certain
conditions, voting in a foreign election, formal

renunciation of citizenship, treason, desertion in
wartime, remaining outside of the United States
to avoid military service, attempt by force to overthrow or bearing arms against the United States,

continuous residence abroad by a naturalized
American citizen. Subsequently, most of the pro-

visions of this act were adopted in the Immigration and Nationalization Act of 1952, 66 Stat.
267, 269-72 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1481-89 (1958).
9 Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491, 502
(1950). The courts have been inconsistent in the
application of the doctrine that subjective intent
to renounce citizenship is not a requirement for
expatriation. Compare Kawakita v. United States,
343 U.S. 717 (1952), with United States v. Esperdy,
203 F.Supp. 380 (1962).

3REV. STAT. §

4 34

1999 (1875).

Stat. 1228 (1907). The acts included foreign
naturalization, taking an oath to a foreign country
and marriage by an American woman to an alien.
5239 U.S. 299 (1915).
r Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 312 (1915).
338 U.S. 491 (1950).

10 For a discussion of the subject of duress in
expatriation law, see Note, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 932
(1954).
11 See, e.g., Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 334

(1939), where the Court defined expatriation as
"the voluntary renunciation or abandonment of
nationality and allegiance."
12 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
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limitation on the congressional power to
regulate in the area of foreign affairs was
the requirement that it act reasonably.
When a rational nexus existed between expatriation and the object of a congressional
power, the government could deprive a
man of his citizenship. 3 Mr. Chief Justice
Warren, in dissenting, maintained that Congress had no constitutional power to divest
an individual of his citizenship. The congressional role in this area was limited to
providing rules for determing when an individual had expatriated himself. Voting in a
foreign election was not such an unequivocal act that it clearly indicated a "voluntary abandonment of American citizenship." '4
In Trop v. Dulles,'5 decided the same
16
day, the Court determined that the statute
imposing expatriation for wartime desertion
was unconstitutional. Chief Justice Warren
repeated his contention that Congress could
not expatriate an individual against his will.
He added a second argument that the use of
expatriation as a penalty for a crime violated the eighth amendment which prohibits
cruel and unusual punishment. 7 Mr. Justice
Brennan distinguished this case from the
Perez decision, explaining what, at first
glance, would seem to be a reversal of position on the constitutionality of expatriation.
In the Trop case, he found no reasonable
relation between expatriation and an asserted congressional power. Therefore, since
the deprivation of citizenship was a severe
penalty, the alternative penal remedies,
rather than expatriation, should be em-

ployed.' s
In the present case, there is an automatic
loss of citizenship when the "statutory set
of facts develop."'l9 There are no provisions
for judicial safeguards. Thus, when Mr.
Justice Goldberg concluded that the legislative history of the act revealed a penal
purpose, it followed that the statute was
unconstitutional since the procedural requirements of a criminal prosecution were
absent. Justice Goldberg expressed no
opinion on the question of whether the use
of expatriation as a punishment was unconstitutional per se. 20 Justice Brennan, in a
concurring opinion, expands upon the view
he had previously expressed in the Trop
case. Recognizing that any reasonable relation to a congressional power is lacking in
this case, he concluded that the statute was
penal. There is a strong denial of any constitutional right of Congress to employ expatriation merely as a penal sanction where
inappropriate to the congressional power.
Deprivation of citizenship will be allowed
only "where some affirmative and unique
relationships to policy are apparent."' 21 The
four dissenting justices maintained that the
purpose of the statute was not penal but
regulatory in that it was designed to promote
the morale of the troops. They further concluded that there was a reasonable relation
between the statutory imposition of expatriation and the congressional war power.
The statute in this case would appear to
be punitive rather than regulatory. It is only
by consoling the armed forces with the

13 Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 58 (1958).

18

Id. at 78 (dissenting opinion of Warren, C. J.).
15 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
'4

1654 Stat. 1168, 1169 (1940),

as amended, 58

Stat. 4 (1944).
17 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99-104 (1958).

Id. at 105-14 (concurring opinion of Brennan,
J.).
19 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144,
167 (1963).
20 d. at 186 n.43.
2. Id. at 188 (concurring opinion of Brennan, J.).
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knowledge that draft evaders will be punished with loss of citizenship that the asserted policy objective can be achieved, and
this is clearly a deterrent and retributive
approach. A statute designed to deter is
22
penal in nature.
In addition, there does not exist a reasonable necessity for any employment of expatriation in the present situation. In the
Perez case, expatriation was perhaps the
only effective means of regulating the participation of our nationals in the elections
of other countries. Under the facts in the
present case, had the individual voluntarily
remained abroad, the imposition of expatriation would fail to achieve the retribution it was designed to effect. On the other
hand, if the individual returns to this country, the available penal sanction 23 would
afford an adequate remedy and the additional infliction of expatriation would appear to make the punishment disproportionate to the crime.
Indeed, to the extent that the severity of
the punishment is an indication of the punitive purpose of the statute, 24 the act in
question appears to be penal. Deprivation
of citizenship has been characterized by the
Court as an "extraordinarily severe
penalty" 25 and "more serious than the taking of one's property or the imposition of a
fine or other penalty." 26 While it is true that
22

Klubock, Expatriation-ItsOrigin and Meaning,

38 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1, 21 (1962).
23 62 Stat. 622 (1948), 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a)

(1958).
The maximum punishment for draft evaders under

this statute is five years imprisonment and $10,000
fine.
24 See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 316
(1946).
25

Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 612

(1949).
26

Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118,

122 (1942).

expatriation may to a dual national cause
but a slight inconvenience, it can have a
severe effect when the individual has but
one nationality and the loss of citizenship
would create statelessness. 2' The stateless
individual may lose the right to have recourse to any courts if he is mistreated by a
state. 2 Indeed, he may lose all rights under

contemporary international law.
Thus, there is a frank recognition by the
majority in the instant case of the position,
taken with somewhat less clarity in Trop v.
Dulles,29 that when a statutory purpose is

clearly punitive, it will be classified as such
rather than as a regulatory measure or as a
"voluntary" act of expatriation. The import
of this decision casts some doubt on the
constitutionality of the Expatriation Act of
1954. 3 0 This act provides for a loss of
citizenship when a person is convicted of
certain crimes, including rebellion, insurrection, seditious conspiracy and advocating
the overthrow of the government in the
manner proscribed by the Smith Act. Notwithstanding its classification as voluntary
expatriation, the basic purpose of this statute is the imposition of loss of citizenship
31
as an added punishment for a crime.
However, since the procedural safeguards
incident to a criminal prosecution are proShaughnessy v. Meyers, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
In this case, an alien who had resided in this country from 1923 to 1948 was barred from re-entering after a visit to Hungary and no country would
grant him citizenship. He was detained on Ellis
Island as a "security risk" and the Supreme Court
denied relief. After four years of "imprisonment,"
an executive remedy was finally granted.
28 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 291 (8th
ed. 1955).
29 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
3068 Stat. 1146 (1954), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(9)
(1958).
27

31 Comment, The Expatriation Act of 1954, 64

YALE L.J. 1164, 1181 (1955).

